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POINT 1 
BOTH THE "FACTS" AND THE LAW CITED IN THE RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
CLEARLY ESTABLISH THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ERRONEOUS. 
The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and adopt the amicus 
brief and reply brief filed by the amicus curiae National Parks and 
Conservation Association ("NPCA"), represented by counsel William 
J. Lockhart, Esq, as though the said briefs were contained herein. 
This court examines an appeal from a lower court's review of 
an administrative decision as if the appeal had come directly from 
the agency, and this court does not need to defer to the lower 
court's findings and conclusions. Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of 
Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1983). Actually, there are 
no lower court findings and conclusions, except those set forth in 
Judge Raymond S. Uno's Memorandum Decision dated December 4, 1987. 
See Appellants' Brief, Addendum, Exhibit No. 6. Under these 
circumstances, this court may disregard Judge Unofs Memorandum 
Decision, and look to the "record" from the administrative agency. 
This "record" consists solely of the Utah State Engineer's 
Memorandum Decision dated December 26, 1985, and the "Affidavit of 
Kent Jones" — Appendixes "B" and "D" to Respondent's brief. 
In pages 9-16 of the Respondent's brief, the Engineer argues 
this case was ripe for summary judgment in the trial court because 
it involves only a "legal" matter. On pages 11-12 of his brief he 
states: 
Plaintiffs argue there are factual disputes which 
require the taking of evidence (Appellants' Brief, pp. 
14-19) . Not so. We claim — and the District Court held 
— that the change application process under Section 73-
3-3 is narrow in scope, and the only issue before the 
State Engineer and the courts on appeal is whether there 
is reason to believe that the change could be made 
without impairing other vested water rights. (R. 52 0-521 
A "C") . That being the case, the only material fact 
relevant to whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" 
under Section 73-3-14, is whether they own water rights 
which might be impaired by the change. 
After making the argument that there are no "factual" disputes 
in the record, the Engineer then proceeds throughout the remainder 
of the brief to argue "facts" which have absolutely no support in 
the "record" before this court, and which are contradicted by the 
memoranda decisions filed as Exhibits in the appendix of the reply 
brief of amicus National Parks and Conservation Association. 
For example, on page 40 of the Respondent's brief, he states: 
In addition, the State Engineer's Office has never 
interpreted the criteria of Section 73-3-8 as applying 
to change applications. In approving or rejecting a 
change application, the State Engineer only considers 
whether other rights will be impaired. The State 
Engineer's disposition of a subject change application 
is fully consistent with this long-held interpretation 
of the applicable statutes. Long standing agency 
interpretation or construction of statutes governing the 
agency are given great difference by the courts in 
determining legislative intent, (emphasis added) 
All this rhetoric may sound fine in isolation, however there 
is not one shred of evidence before this court to support any of 
the conclusions made on page 4 0 in the cited provision above. 
Moreover, this interpretation by the Engineer is being raised for 
the first time on appeal, and under general principles of appellate 
review, this court may not consider points raised by the Engineer 
for the first time on appeal. 
Even if this court could consider the conclusionary statements 
made on page 40 about the Engineer's "long standing agency 
interpretation or construction of statutes governing the agency," 
the Plaintiffs submit this court cannot find one letter, word, 
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sentence, paragraph or exhibit anywhere in the "record11 or within 
the four corners of either the Respondent's brief or the amicus 
curiae brief which supports the conclusion. Surprisingly, there 
is no affidavit from the Engineer himself stating he has never 
interpreted the criteria of Section 73-3-8 as applying to change 
applications. There is no affidavit from him stating that he only 
considers whether other rights will be impaired in approving or 
rejecting a change application. 
Finally, there is no affidavit from the Engineer stating he 
has any long standing agency interpretation or construction of 
statues governing the water laws. His counselfs bare, naked 
conclusions are not "evidence" and do not appear anywhere in the 
"record" presented to this court. The Engineer may be embarrassed 
because the record is so totally defective in submitting such an 
affidavit in the trial court, however that problem is something he 
must acknowledge, but he should not try to hoodwink this court into 
believing "disputed" facts are not in dispute. 
Not only is there a total void of any affidavit by counsel 
establishing "facts" to support the conclusions made on page 4 0 of 
Respondent's brief, there are not even any citations to memoranda 
decisions or other documents from the Engineer's office that might 
support this conclusion. Finally, it must be acknowledged there 
are no exhibits in either the Respondent's brief or the amici water 
users' brief purporting to be memoranda decisions or other 
documents declaring the Engineer has never interpreted the criteria 
of Section 73-3-8 as applying to change applications, or that he 
has only considered whether other rights will be impaired when 
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approving or rejecting a change application. 
In stark contrast to this total lack of any "record" on the 
part of the Respondent and the amici water users, the reply brief 
of amicus NPCA is replete with numerous instances, including copies 
of the appropriate memoranda decisions in its addendum, which 
clearly demonstrate the statements made on page 4 0 of the 
Respondent's brief are not accurate. These examples in the amicus 
NPCA's reply brief reveal several times the State Engineer has in 
fact applied the criteria of Section 73-3-8 to change applications, 
and has further considered both the public interest and particular 
objections by individual protestants who do not own any "vested 
water rights" in approving or rejecting a change application. The 
Engineer's failure to bring these other inconsistent memoranda 
decisions to the attention of this court appears to be an attempt 
to mislead this court as to what the Engineer's "long established 
practices and interpretations" are. In any event, it is clear 
there is no "record" to support the bare, naked conclusions made 
on page 4 0 of the Respondent's brief, and it also appears clear 
those conclusions are not accurate, and are effectively rebutted 
by the inclusion of other memoranda decisions in the NPCA's brief. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs submit the 
Respondent's brief raises serious factual disputes dealing with 
interpretation given by the State Engineer to the criteria of 
Section 73-3-8 as applying to change applications, and this fact 
by itself would preclude the trial or this court granting summary 
j udgment. 
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In addition to the "factual" disputes in the Respondent's 
brief, the Engineer also cites a recent Utah Court of Appeals 
decision, allegedly supporting the Engineer's position that the 
Plaintiffs in the instant case are not entitled to a review of the 
Engineer's memorandum decision because the statute did not so 
provide. See page 11 of Respondent's brief and the discussion of 
the case of Robert J. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appealsf 
95 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah 1988). 
If this Utah Court of Appeals decision has any bearing on any 
of the issues in the instant case, it escapes the Plaintiffs! All 
the court of appeals held in DeBry was that the court had appellate 
jurisdiction over "(a) The final orders and decrees of State and 
local agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
them..." The court then said it was authorized to review agency 
decisions only when the legislature expressly authorizes a right 
of review, and since there was no right of review to DeBry in the 
final order of the Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, his appeal 
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Obviously DeBry has 
nothing to do with the instant case, where the right of review of 
the decision of the Utah State Engineer is specifically provided 
for in Sections 73-3-14 and 15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
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POINT 2 
THE ENGINEER'S DISCUSSION OP THE TERM "ANY PERSON AGGRIEVED" 
IN SECTION 73-3-14 CITES CASES THAT HAVE BEEN EXPRESSLY OVERRULED 
BY THE JURISDICTIONS DECIDING THEM, PAILS TO RESPOND TO THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT CASES CITED IN THE APPELLANTS1 BRIEF, AND DOES 
NOT DEAL WITH THE FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE INSTANT CASE, NOR 
WITH THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS THIS COURT IS BEING ASKED TO 
INTERPRET. 
On pages 17-33 of the Respondents brief, the Engineer 
discusses the issue of whether the Plaintiffs are "aggrieved 
persons" as that term is used in Section 73-3-14, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. The Engineer states on page 28 of his 
brief "Plaintiffs have alleged...their personal, economic and 
direct interest in the Engineer's memorandum decision (Appellants1 
brief, p. 25) . That is not enough to make them 'aggrieved 
persons.1" In support of this statement, the Engineer cites the 
case of Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow, 467 P.2d 395 (N.M. 1970). 
Ruidoso involved a review of the order of the commissioner of 
banking which approved an application establishing a new bank. The 
protestant was a competing bank who, even though acknowledging 
there were no statutes preventing the lawful competition of a new 
bank, alleged it would be harmed by a loss of profits because of 
the competition. 
Had the Engineer taken a few moments to shepardize this case, 
he would have discovered Ruidoso was expressly and specifically 
overruled five years later in De Vargas Savings and Loan 
Association of Santa Fe v. Campbell, 87 N.M. 469, 535 P.2d 1320 
(1975) . And had the Engineer made a full disclosure of what De 
Vargas held, it would be clear to this court the United States 
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Supreme Court decisions cited and discussed on pages 33-45 of 
Appellants1 brief [but which surprisingly are not touched on at all 
in the Respondent's brief or the amici water users' brief, except 
for a very perfunctory reference to the Clarke case], the Engineer 
would have discovered the New Mexico and Oklahoma cases cited by 
the Engineer in his brief, not only fail to establish any authority 
for the position taken, but are actually authority for the position 
of the appellants in this court. 
In De Vargas, which overruled Ruidoso, there is much helpful 
language in this later decision which supports the Plaintiffs' 
position in the instant case. The case involved four savings and 
loan associations who claimed they would be economically hurt, 
because the savings and loan supervisor granted authority to 
another building and loan association to operate a branch office. 
The trial court dismissed the appeal from the state agency, basing 
its dismissal expressly on the Ruidoso case, supra. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court noted the specific issue to be resolved was "whether 
the Appellants or associations are persons 'aggrieved and directly 
effected' by the order of the Supervisor within the purview of 
Section 48-15-133. The broader issue is whether or not New Mexico 
will continue to cling to the "legal interest" test of standing as 
enunciated in Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow." 
The De Vargas court recognized that in Ruidoso it had said 
the "true test was whether Appellants' legal rights had been 
invaded, not merely whether he has suffered any actual pecuniary 
loss or been deprived of any actual pecuniary benefit." THIS IS 
EXACTLY THE SAME TEST THE ENGINEER IS ASKING THIS COURT TO ADOPT 
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IN THE INSTANT CASE! However, the De Vargas court noted "the 
efficacy of this test has been denounced by legal scholars and 
expressly disclaimed by the United States Supreme Court. See Data 
Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 
184 (1970)." Data Processing was the very case the United States 
Supreme Court relied on in deciding Clarke v. Securities Industries 
Association, 497 U.S. , 107 S.Ct. , 93 L.Ed.2d 757 
(1987), discussed more fully in Appellants1 brief at pages 33-45. 
The De Vargas court observed that Data Processing involved 
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act found at 5 U.S.C. 
Section 702, and noted the general principles espoused in the act 
are applicable to the broad question of standing to seek judicial 
review, be it specifically conferred by statute or otherwise. 
Consequently, the De Vargas New Mexico Supreme Court found the 
discussion of the Federal Administrative Procedures Act in Data 
Processing to be applicable to local interests and to the 
particular fact situation then before the court. 
The Plaintiffs submit this statement by the De Vargas New 
Mexico Supreme Court effectively disposes of the Engineer's 
argument on pages 24-25 of his brief: 
However, it must be remembered that federal 
regulatory programs in general — and the regulatory 
scheme involved in Clarke specifically, are usually much 
broader in scope than the narrow administrative process 
involved in change applications...Regulation of the 
national banking industry is obviously a broad regulatory 
scheme, as are many other federal administrative 
programs. That, however, is a far cry from the very 
narrow process for acting on change applications as set 
forth in Section 73-3-3, and Clarke is simply 
distinguishable on its facts...We submit that state court 
cases applying the 'zone of interest1 test to more narrow 
regulatory programs are much more akin to the case at bar 
than federal cases." 
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Consequently, whether one considers the United States Supreme 
Court cases cited by Clarke as involving the federal regulatory 
programs and the federal administrative procedures act, or 
considers these same cases to be applicable to local state court 
cases such as De Vargas, the result is exactly the same. 
The Engineer must now admit one of the cases he cited in 
support of his arguments pertaining to "aggrieved persons," as well 
as his discussion of the applicability of the United States Supreme 
Court cases to the issues before this court, has now been 
overruled, and those very states he cited have now adopted the 
rationale of the United States Supreme Court cases as those cases 
are more fully described in Appellants' brief at pages 33-45. 
Oklahoma has also adopted the De Vargas rationale in Bank of the 
Lakes v. First State Bank, 708 P.2d 1089 (Okla. 1985). The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the appeal, but only on the grounds 
that Section 207(A), as amended by the Oklahoma legislature, did 
not recognize as grounds for appeal the type in injury that Bank 
of the Lakes alleged. Obviously, Utah has no legislative language 
that would carve out a "exception" to the general principles on 
standing and "aggrieved parties" as enunciated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Clarke, and by the New Mexico Supreme Court in De 
Vargas. 
Going back to De Vargas, there are several additional comments 
which the Plaintiffs submit are helpful to this court in deciding 
the standing issue in the instant case. In citing from a law 
review article [Utton, "Through a Glass Darkly: The Law of 
Standing to Challenge Governmental Action in New Mexico," 2 New 
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Mexico L. Rev. 171, 177 (1972),] the court approved the following 
language: 
In addition, if the very thing the complainant is 
challenging [is] the lawfulness of governmental action, 
to deny standing by saying the action complained of is 
lawful is to decide the case on the merits without 
deciding argument on the merits. If the action 
complained of is arguably unlawful, then the complaining 
party who is injured in fact should be allowed to argue 
the merits before the court, and not to have access to 
judicial determination barred at the threshold of the 
courthouse. (emphasis added) 
This is exactly what the Engineer is trying to accomplish in 
the instant case — to stop the Plaintiffs at the courthouse door, 
but not allow them to enter the courthouse, or to have a trial on 
the merits of whether the Engineer's conduct in conducting the 
investigation he admits in his memorandum decision he did conduct 
was negligently performed, for failure to follow the statutory 
mandates in 73-3-8. 
The De Vargas court held that "to attain standing in a suit 
arguing the unlawfulness of governmental action, the complainant 
must allege that he is injured in fact or eminently threatened with 
injury, economic or otherwise.11 In the instant case, the 
Plaintiffs have alleged in their second amended complaint numerous 
grounds showing they are injured in fact, or are eminently 
threatened with injury, economic or otherwise, because of the 
action of the Engineer in conducting a faulty investigation of the 
evidence presented at his hearing in February, 1985. Since none 
of the facts in the second amended complaint are controverted by 
the Engineer or the amici water users, they must be taken as true 
in a motion for summary judgment. This is another reason why the 
Plaintiffs submit the motion for summary judgment was not ripe for 
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determination, and should not have been granted. 
The De Vargas court adopted holdings from other United States 
Supreme Court decisions stating that "standing is not confined to 
those who show economic harm, as aesthetic and environment well-
being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients to the 
quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular 
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few 
does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the 
judicial process." 
The New Mexico Supreme Court also found the discussion of 
these "standing" issues in a federal circuit court of appeals case 
compelling. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 
U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C.Cir. 1970), the language 
approved from Scanwell is as follows: 
When the Congress has laid down guidelines to be 
followed in carrying out its mandate in a specific area, 
there should be some procedure whereby those who are 
injured by the arbitrary or capricious action of a 
governmental agency or official in ignoring those 
procedures can vindicate their very real interests, while 
at the same time furthering the public interests. These 
are the people who will really have the incentive to 
bring suit against illegal government action, and they 
are precisely the plaintiffs who insure a genuine 
adversary case or controversy. 
* * * 
Regardless of the merits of plaintiff's case, it 
should be granted the right, if possible, to make a prima 
facie showing that the government's agents did in fact 
ignore the Congressional guidelines in the manner in 
which they handled the granting of the contracts. If 
there is arbitrary or capricious action on the part of 
any contracting official, who is going to complain about 
it, if not the party denied a contract as the result of 
the alleged illegal activity? It seems to us that it 
would be a very healthy check in governmental action to 
allow such suits, *** (emphasis added) 
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Similarly, in the instant case, the Plaintiffs allege they 
should be granted the right to make a prima facie showing that the 
Engineer did in fact ignore the Utah Legislature's guidelines in 
Section 73-3-8 in the manner in which he conducted the 
investigation of the evidence produced at his February, 1985 
hearing, which evidence clearly showed the change order was 
"detrimental to the public welfare.11 
Obviously, the New Mexico Supreme Court in De Vargas adopted 
the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Data 
Processing, as did the United States Supreme Court in Clarke, 
supra. The Utah Supreme Court has also cited Data Processing with 
approval with respect to the "standing" issue. Society of 
Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987), in 
note 12 thereof on page 1176 of the pacific reports. Presumably 
this court will also adopt the reasoning in Clarke, which is based 
on the Data Processing rational and holding, and will also adopt 
the other cases cited in Clarke as those cases are more fully 
discussed in the Appellants1 brief on pages 33-45. 
Unfortunately, the Engineer does not fare any better in the 
other cases he cites in support of his contention that Plaintiffs 
are not "aggrieved persons" within the meaning of Section 73-3-14. 
On pages 29-30 of the Respondent's brief, the Engineer cites and 
discusses the case of Deseret Mortuary Co. v. State Securities 
Commission, et al., 78 Utah 393, 3 P.2d 267 (1931). The court in 
Deseret Mortuary looked at the entire language of the statute in 
question and found from other sections the words "issuers, dealers 
or salesmen of securities" thereby convincing the court these were 
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the persons to be protected and, consequently, only those persons 
had standing. The Engineer in the instant case cannot point to any 
language in the Utah water law statutes saying only persons with 
"vested water rights have standing," and therefore Deseret Mortuary 
does not appear to help him at all. 
On the other hand, this court in Deseret Mortuary discussed 
certain legal authorities defining the term "any person aggrieved" 
and the Plaintiffs submit those definitions are supportive of the 
Plaintiffs1 position in this court. Why the Engineer did not 
continue his discussion of Deseret Mortuary by pointing out these 
critical definitions, is, again, a mystery to the Plaintiffs, 
unless the Engineer believed a discussion of these matters would 
be detrimental to his position in this court. 
In Deseret Mortuary, the court noted some of the definitions 
then in vogue stating "that a party is aggrieved by the judgment 
or decree where it operates in his rights of property or bears 
directly upon his interest. * * * The word 'aggrieved1 refers to 
a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal property right, 
or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation." The 
court also noted other cases saying a person can be aggrieved if 
they own property in a severed area, and other cases defining 
persons to be aggrieved if they have some pecuniary interest to 
protect. 
Thus it appears clear this court in Deseret Mortuary defined 
"any person aggrieved" at the time the decision was written in 1931 
as those whose rights of property are effected by the decree, or 
if it bears directly upon their interest, or denies them some real 
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or personal property right, or imposes upon them a burden or 
obligation. These are the very things the Plaintiffs have alleged 
in their second amended complaint. They are the very terms and 
conditions which the Engineer on page 28 of his brief states are 
not sufficient to make the Plaintiffs "aggrieved persons," although 
Deseret Mortuary reaches a contrary result! 
In the case of Colthorp v. Mountain Home Irrigation District, 
175 P.2d 1005 (Ida. 1945), discussed on pages 45-46 of the 
Respondent's brief to support the proposition that an "injury" to 
another water right must be shown in order to prevent a change in 
the point of diversion, the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear the 
"injury" they were discussing was within a specific provision of 
the Idaho statute, to wit, "As to change a place of use or transfer 
water (within a Carey Act system, Section 41-2101, I.e.A.) the only 
injury which another user may set up is the injury to his water 
right and/or the use thereof.11 
On pages 28-29 of his brief, the Engineer cites the case of 
Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Commission, 736 P.2d 516 
(Okla. 1987) , to support the claim that Plaintiffs do not have 
standing to object to the Engineer's memorandum decision. The 
Engineer says this is "another analogous case." The Plaintiffs 
submit it is about as analogous as a hippopotamus to a butterfly! 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court was construing a specific statute which 
stated that car dealerships could protest new franchises being 
opened within a radius of ten miles from the site of a potential 
new dealership. The Plaintiffs were outside that ten mile radius, 
as the court noted: "However, in the present case, Appellant 
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dealers of the same line-make are not located within ten miles of 
the new franchise which they seek to challenge...This legislation 
provides for no protest in that event, and it is quite clear that 
we may not infer an intent to the contrary." 
It is obvious the ten miles radius built-in provision in the 
Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Statute is totally missing in the Utah water 
law statutes. There is no built-in language by the Utah 
Legislature stating "any aggrieved persons" must have vested water 
rights, as the Engineer interprets the statute, and not one of the 
Engineer's cases cited in his Respondent's brief so holds under the 
facts and circumstances in the instant case. Furthermore, as 
pointed out above, Oklahoma has now adopted the New Mexico Supreme 
Court reasoning in De Vargas with respect to "standing." Bank of 
the Lakes v. First State Bank, 708 P.2d 1089 (Okla. 1985). 
Similarly, in the case of In re Johnson, et al., 300 P. 492 
(Ida. 1931), discussed on page 46 of the Respondent's brief, the 
Idaho Supreme Court was dealing with a prior court decree, and an 
Idaho statute quite dissimilar from the statutes in the instant 
case. The court was construing "injury" that may accrue to another 
person growing out of the fact that he is a tenant in common of the 
same conduit or ditch facilities with the owner of the water 
transferred. Obviously the Plaintiffs in the instant case are not 
claiming any joint use of the Conservancy District's or Draper 
Irrigation Company's ditch facilities. Furthermore, there is no 
Utah statute involved in the instant case governing either 
"abandonment of water or what rights one tenant in common has 
against another." These were the only issues involved in Johnson. 
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In summary, then, it appears clear the cases cited by the 
Engineer in support of his proposition that the Plaintiffs are not 
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 73-3-14 do not 
support his conclusion, some of them have been expressly overruled, 
and the other cases actually support the Plaintiffs1 position in 
this court rather than the Engineer's! 
POINT 3 
THE CASES CITED BY THE ENGINEER IN SUPPORT OF HIS ARGUMENT 
THAT THE CRITERIA OF SECTION 7 3-3-8 DO NOT APPLY TO CHANGE 
APPLICATIONS FILED PURSUANT TO SECTION 73-3-3 CONTAIN THE SAME 
INFIRMITIES AS THOSE CITED IN POINT 2 AND DO NOT SUPPORT HIS 
CONCLUSIONS AT ALL. 
The Engineer's argument with respect to this Point 3 is based 
on a defective syllogistic reasoning. The Engineer argues as 
follows: 
1. All Utah Supreme Court cases dealing with change 
applications involve competing water rights where the parties on 
both sides of the case had "vested water interests." 
2. Admittedly there are no cases from Utah discussing change 
applications under Section 73-3-3, nor the duties and 
responsibilities of the Engineer under Section 73-3-8, and which 
even remotely involve the facts and circumstances of the instant 
case, or the precise issues now before this court. 
3. Therefore, the prior cases involving competitors with 
vested water rights on both sides of the case must apply to the 
facts and circumstances in the instant case, and to the precise 
issues now before this court. 
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The fatal defect in this type of reasoning is obvious. The 
Engineer is trying to make apples out of oranges. He is not 
comparing apples and apples or oranges and oranges. The cases the 
Engineer cites, as described below, involve far different factual 
circumstances, and discuss totally different issues than exist in 
the instant case. 
The Engineer, throughout his Respondent's brief, acknowledges 
the Plaintiffs would have standing to challenge the Engineerfs 
memorandum decision if this case involved an original water 
application under Section 73-3-2, [see Respondent's brief, note 7, 
page 20, and his comments on pages 34-35], but then argues the 
plaintiffs cannot challenge his decision under change applications 
pursuant to 73-3-3, even though the substantial damage to the 
public welfare, and to the Plaintiffs' legal interest, personal and 
real property, and economic considerations are admittedly the same 
in both situations. The Engineer makes this same argument with 
respect to his duties under Section 73-3-8, and asserts even though 
he has these duties and responsibilities for an original water 
application, he can close his eyes, fold his arms, quietly go to 
sleep and not conduct a 73-3-8 investigation when considering 
change applications, even though everybody in his office would 
admit the change applications create conditions "detrimental to 
the public welfare." 
The Engineer's memorandum decision admits that, at a hearing 
in his office in Salt Lake City on February 26, 1985, he received 
information from the protestant that, as a result of the project 
construction, his property was flooded in 1983 and 1984, causing 
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extensive property damage and further received evidence that the 
project "as constructed was detrimental to the public welfare." 
The Engineer then states that "In an effort to gain additional 
information relative to this matter, the State Engineer's Staff 
conducted a field review on May 7, 1985. Representatives of both 
the applicant and the protestant were present for the review, which 
included observations of alleged damage to the protestant!s 
property, along with observations of the Districtfs construction 
which took place in connection with temporary water rights change 
applications approved by the State Engineer." 
The Plaintiffs submit the Engineer admits in this memorandum 
decision language that his office did in fact conduct an 
investigation similar to that contemplated by Section 73-3-8 
pertaining to the evidence he received at the hearing showing the 
project, as constructed, was "detrimental to the public welfare." 
The Plaintiffs submit, and they allege in their second amended 
complaint, this investigation undertaken by the State Engineer was 
faulty and negligently done, and the District Court had ample 
authority to review the procedures used by the State Engineer in 
his investigation to determine whether or not the Engineer 
undertook the investigation outlined in 73-3-8, and if he did, 
whether he conducted this investigation negligently as the 
Plaintiffs1 allege in their second amended complaint. 
The Respondent and amici water users are now asking this court 
to tear out that portion of the memorandum decision, admitting an 
investigation was undertaken, and are asking this court to close 
its eyes to what actually happened, and rule on the "record" that 
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the Engineer really doesn't have a duty to undertake the very 
investigation he undertook. Lifting a comment from the 
Respondent's brief, this argument is "pretty weak soup!" 
The first point raised by the Engineer is found on page 4 0 of 
his brief. He states he has never interpreted the criteria of 
Section 73-3-8 as applying to change applications, and further 
states he considers only whether other water rights will be 
impaired when approving or rejecting a change application. He 
states his disposition of the change application in the instant 
case "is fully consistent with his long-held interpretation of the 
applicable statutes." This logic and reasoning falls apart 
completely, because the Engineer has failed to deliver to this 
court any "record" supporting his conclusion of the Engineer's 
"long standing interpretation" of the Utah water laws statutes. 
This matter has been fully briefed by amicus NPCA in its reply 
brief which includes some 2 5 memoranda decisions, several of which 
show clearly the Engineer's "long standing interpretation" is not 
as represented to this court in Respondent's brief. See also the 
Appellants' discussion of this same issue in Point 1, supra, at 
pages 2 - 4. 
The next position taken by the Engineer is that the case law 
supports his position that the only criteria for approval or 
rejection of a change application is whether other vested water 
rights would be impaired. The Engineer then cites Utah Supreme 
Court cases on pages 41-44 of his brief, which he alleges interpret 
the precise question in the instant case. However, the Plaintiff 
submits not one of those cases deals with a fact situation even 
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remotely similar to the facts in the instant case. This is where 
the defective syllogistic reasoning set out in the first paragraph 
of this Point 3 applies. All the cases cited deal with competing 
interests where the parties on both sides of the case had 
established "vested water rights." Therefore the court was not 
called upon in any of those cases to construe the precise issue in 
the instant case, to wit, whether parties have standing to sue as 
"aggrieved persons" when they do not have "vested water rights." 
Furthermore, none of the cases cited by the Engineer on pages 41-
44 deal with whether the Engineer's responsibilities under Section 
73-3-8 apply to his consideration of change applications in Section 
73-3-3, and his counsel has not enlightened this court by citing 
any language dealing with that issue. 
The Engineer does cite the case of In re Application of 
Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M.App. 1988), which was not discussed in 
the court below. The Engineer cites Sleeper for the proposition 
that he cannot consider the "public welfare" issues imposed upon 
him in Section 73-3-8 when considering change applications. The 
court in Sleeper based its decision on two major premises. The 
first was that the parties all stipulated the Engineer had 
traditionally and consistently construed the New Mexico state water 
laws, and particularly those dealing with the "public interest" to 
apply only to original applications for unappropriated waters. 
This is not the situation in the instant case, where counsel 
for the Plaintiffs and amicus National Parks and Conservation 
Association have not stipulated the Utah State Engineer has 
traditionally and consistently construed the Utah water laws in the 
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same way. Furthermore, the excellent discussion of these matters 
in amicus National Parks and Conservation Association's brief and 
the inclusion in the addendum of pertinent memoranda decisions show 
the Engineer's interpretation has been anything but consistent. 
Furthermore, in the instant case, the Engineer has not supported 
his conclusionary statements about "long standing agency 
interpretation," nor any of the other assertions on page 4 0 with 
an affidavit from the State Engineer, copies of any memoranda 
decisions made a part of the Respondent's brief, or even citations 
to such memoranda decisions. 
The Sleeper case dealt, again, with competing interests 
between water users on both sides who had "vested water rights." 
It did not deal with the facts in the instant case, any more than 
the Utah Supreme Court cases cited by the Engineer do. The New 
Mexico court noted the legislature had changed the law in 1985 to 
provide the Engineer could consider the "public interest," when 
approving or rejecting change applications, however the statutes 
in force at the time of the Application did not allow "public 
interest" to be taken into account. This is totally different from 
Section 73-3-8 which has been in existence for decades, and clearly 
provides the Engineer can consider all evidence presented to him 
bearing on whether the applications are "detrimental to the public 
welfare." 
In determining whether the Plaintiffs' interests rise to the 
level of something which is "detrimental to the public welfare," 
the Engineer in footnote 17 on page 47 of his brief, cites the case 
of Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. Marsh, 596 F.Supp. 
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548 (Dist.Utah 1984), and state "Plaintiffs cannot equate their 
private interests to the 'public interests.'" This comment totally 
ignores the allegations in the second amended complaint dealing 
with the "public" nature of the damage to highways, parks and 
recreation properties, ditch facilities belonging to quasi-public 
corporations, etc. The Engineer also fails to point out the 
distinctions between the instant case and Great Salt Lake ("GSL"), 
and further fails to point out this court has already determined 
what the term "public welfare" under the water laws means. As 
discussed on page 52 of the Appellants1 brief, this court in Tanner 
v. Bacon, 136 P. 2d 957 (Utah 1943) , held that anything which is not 
for the best interest of the public would be "detrimental to the 
public welfare." 
Clearly in the instant case, when the change application 
results in a virtual "niagara falls" being allowed to exist on the 
mountainside above the Plaintiffs1 properties, and to allow water 
to come cascading down with its attendant debris, rocks, etc. and 
to destroy Plaintiffs1 real and personal property, to create danger 
to the safety and welfare of persons in the vicinity, to tear up 
public roads, and gut public parks and recreation properties — all 
as more fully set forth in the Plaintiffs1 second amended complaint 
to which this court is referred, and which allegations must be 
accepted as true for a motion for summary judgment — it is clear 
the change application is "detrimental to the public welfare." 
In GSL, the United States District Court for Utah was asked 
to review a decision of the Army Corp. of Engineers to issue a 
permit to the Utah Department of Natural Resources to discharge 
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fill material into the Great Salt Lake in connection with a flood-
control project to breach a railroad causeway across the lake. The 
plaintiffs filed their complaint to stop this discharge, and sought 
a preliminary injunction. The court on page 353 of the Federal 
Reports set out the four grounds the plaintiffs must prove to 
entitle them to a preliminary injunction. The court found the 
plaintiffs had failed on their proof on grounds 1, 3 and 4. Only 
the 4th point "A showing that the injunction, if issued, would not 
be adverse to the public interest," pertains to any of the issues 
in the instant case. 
On that point, the court found the Utah Legislature had 
already determined and announced the public policy of the State of 
Utah would be to breach the causeway. This declaration was 
approved by the Governor and legislation was passed after 
considerable study and debate. The court specifically found "Thus, 
the public interest has been expressed by the representative of the 
public, the State Legislature... Given the clear expression of the 
legislative and executive branches of the State of Utah, and the 
continuing risk of serious flood damage that could be alleviated 
by the breach, the court concludes that the movants have not 
established that the injunction 'would not be adverse to the public 
interest.'" 
The Engineerfs counsel in the instant case was also attorney 
for some of the defendants in GSL. He must know the GSL case had 
nothing whatsoever to do with an interpretation of Section 73-3-8, 
and his inclination to twist and torture the ruling of the federal 
court in GSL is indeed a curious result. It's obvious the court 
-23-
in GSL was considering whether the Corp. of Engineers1 action was 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law." It also appears crystal clear the Utah 
Legislature in the instant case has not studied the change 
application approved by the State Engineer, and which caused damage 
to the Plaintiffs1 properties, as well as other public properties 
in the area. Clearly the State Legislature has not given any 
permission to the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
and/or Draper Irrigation Company to discharge their waters on to 
the Plaintiffs1 property, allowing tens of thousands of gallons of 
water to escape down the hillside as it did in 1983 and 1984. 
Contrary to all the Engineer's innuendos, the Legislature has, in 
Section 73-3-8, made it abundantly clear the Engineer "must" reject 
a change application if he finds it will be "detrimental to the 
public welfare." The public interest problems are set out in 
substantial detail in the Plaintiffs1 second amended complaint. 
The last point made by the Engineer in his brief involves his 
attempt to determine legislative intent by examining the language 
found in 73-3-3 dealing with "rights and duties of the applicant." 
See Respondent's brief, pages 37-40. The Plaintiffs adopt the 
reasoning of amicus National Parks and Conservation Association in 
their reply brief as an adequate response to the Engineer's 
position on this issue. Moreover, it seems rather obvious that if 
the "rights and duties" of the applicant are expressly stated in 
Section 73-3-3, when considering permanent change applications, to 
be the same as the rights and duties of the applicant when original 
water applications are being considered, there would be no reason 
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to believe the rights and duties of the Engineer in Section 73-3-
3 would not also be subject to a like interpretation, to wit, that 
the Engineer's rights and duties to conduct an investigation under 
Section 73-3-3 would be the same as his rights and duties in 
connection with an original water application, as those rights and 
duties are more fully defined in Section 73-3-8. There would be 
no logical reason for the legislature to make a distinction between 
the "applicants111 rights and duties and the "Engineer's11 rights and 
duties, and in fact the legislature did not do so. 
In summary, then, it appears clear the Engineer's brief does 
not offer any support for the proposition that the duties and 
responsibilities imposed on the Engineer in Section 73-3-8 do not 
apply to change applications in Section 73-3-3. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs submit this 
court should find the Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" within the 
meaning of Section 73-3-14, that the Plaintiffs have standing to 
bring the instant action in the District Court to review the 
memorandum decision of the Engineer, and further that the 
Engineer's duties and responsibilities under Section 73-3-8 do 
apply to change applications. The Plaintiffs are entitled to their 
day in court with respect to their second amended complaint 
alleging the Engineer was negligent in the way he undertook these 
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duties and responsibilities which he admits he undertook in his 
memorandum decision. 
DATED this 20th day of January, 1989. 
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